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COMMENT
THE FLORIDA FAIR TRADE ACT CASE
MANUEL HARNIK*
Judiciary and Legislature came to grips when the Florida Supreme
Court in Liquor Store Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corp.' declared
the State Fair Trade Act of i939 2 to be unconstitutional and, immedi-
ately afterwards, the State Legislature-with a few insertions-reenacted
the law.3
It may be retrospectively recalled that fair trade agreements (con-
tracts relating to maintenance of minimum prices in specialty pro-
ducts), often employed as a remedy against price cutting, found pas-
sionate resistance in certain quarters. After many unsuccessful at-
tempts in federal courts4 as well as in the courts of several states5 the
opponents of fair trade succeeded in having price maintenance agree-
ments, made in the absence of statutory right, declared violative of the
Anti-Trust laws. 6 Almost all states7 therefore successively enacted es-
sentially uniform fair trade laws, legalizing within their jurisdictions
vertical price maintenance agreements in identified goods and making
them binding on all dealers who know of the agreements, even those
who do not participate in them (non-signers)
The fight around fair trade did not cease. On the contrary, vehe-
ment attacks were now made upon the validity of the statutes which
legalized price maintenance agreements. As the attackers were mainly
non-signers, they concentrated the fight on that provision which made
fair trade agreements binding on them.
Through somewhat unusual formulation of the non-signer provis-
ions the impression may be created that it constitutes a striking de-
*Dr. Jur., Austria.
140 S. (2d) 371 (Fla. 1949).
2Fla. Stat. Ann. § 541.o et. seq. (1941).
1Florida Laws, c. 25204.
'Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Jaynes Drug Co., 149 Fed. 838 (C. C. D. Mass. i9oG):
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Platt, 142 Fed. 6o6 (C. C. N. D. Ill. E. D. 19o6); and many
others.
5Grogan v. Chaffee, 156 Cal. 611, io5 Pac. 745 (19o9); Garst v. Hams, 177 Mass.
72, 58 N. E. 174 (10oo); and others.
6Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Cons Co., 220 U. S. 373, 31 S. Ct. 376,
55 L. ed. 502 (1911); John D. Parks & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 Fed. 24 (C. C. A. 6th,
1907).
7Except Missouri, Texas, Vermont and the District of Columbia.
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parture from the traditional law of contracts, in that the owner of a
trade-mark may, by unilateral action, dictate to non-contracting dealers
such prices as satisfy his economic desires or even Ins personal whim
and caprice. This theoretical criticism, naturally, led to the constitu-
tional objection that the statute delegated legislative power to private
persons. These objections which are given prominence in the Liquor
Store decision were broadly discussed in previous cases in other states.8
Logically, it seems irrelevant whether such attacks were made in the
name of the Federal or of a State Constitution. The Supreme Court
of the United States, within its jurisdiction, finally settled the issue.9
With regard to the non-signer provision it pointed emphatically to the
fact that the obligation is only laid on those who when purchasing
know of the existing contract. They are advisedly free not to buy
identified goods and if they buy they are still free to sell them at less
than a fixed minimum price, provided that they remove the trade-
mark or brand from the commodity. The statutory duty laid on the
non-signer who deliberately buys trade-marked merchandise which is
encumbered with contractual price restrictions and sells it below the
fixed minimum price, is not based on the contract. It is an obligation
ex delicto.'0 It is therefore clear that no legislative power is delegated
to the owner of a trade-mark. The owner of the good will as represented
by the trade-mark who has made a fair trade contract with some dealers,
has no reason to impose any price restrictions on the other dealers
since these restrictions automatically run with the acquisition.
The distinction made between the commodity itself, which unques-
tionably is the property of the buyer although he may have refused to
sign a fair trade contract, and the good will which is not sold with the
commodity was intended to refute also the objection that the non-sign-
ing purchaser is deprived of free enjoyment of his property without
due process of law.
Seagrams-Distillers Corp. v. Old Dearborn Distributing Co., 36 3 Ill. 6io, 2 N. E.
(2d) 940 (1936), aff'd Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299
U. S. 183, 57 S. Ct. i39, 81 L. ed. 1o9 (1936); Joseph Triner Corp. v. McNeil, 363 Ill.
559, 2 N. E. (2d) 929 (1936), aff'd McNeil v. Joseph Triner Corp., 299 U. S. 183, 57
S. Ct. 139, 81 L. ed. io9 (1936); Max Factor & Co. v. Kunsman, 5 Cal. (2d) 446, 55 P
(2d) i77 (1936), aff'd Kunsman v. Max Factor & Co., 299 U. S. 198, 57 S. Ct. 147, 81
L. ed. 122 (1936).
0Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U. S. 183, 57
S. Ct. 139, 81 L. ed. lo9 (1936).
2Unjustifiable interference with contract rights of others has long been recog-
nized as a tort. Max Factor & Co. v. Kunsman, 5 Cal. (2d) 446, 55 P. (2d) 177, 185
(1936). There is, of course, no tort committed, if the non-signer acquired the mer-
chandise before getting notice of an existing fmr trade contract. See Harper, Fair
Trade in the Courts (1946) 69-76.
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As the Florida Court does not find the reasoning of the Supreme
Court of the United States persuasive, it takes the position that "the
court of last resort of each sovengn state is the final arbiter as to whether
the act conforms to its own Constitution "11
The Court quite evidently does not approve of the idea of fair
trade; it regards it as an unreasonable price fixing measure. Realizing,
however, that the legislature alone "is the judge of the wisdom of the
regulation"' 2 it feels its duty to delve into the purposes of the act in
order to find whether or not it violates the State Constitution.
Such a (price fixing) statute, so argues the Court, can only be valid
if it applies to the general public with a view to promoting its welfare.
As the statute, however, is interpreted as favoring particular groups at
the expense of others, it cannot be recognized as enacted in the interest
of general welfare. There is therefore no true exercise of police power
involved. "When a statute is brought into question resting upon the
police power the courts have the duty to inquire whether it is within
constitutional limits It is particularly a judicial question whether
the legislative act is for a private or a public purpose."' 3 The Court, in
fact, criticizes the social and economic philosophy on which fair trade
legislation is based.
The Court then exposes how far particular groups are favored by
legalized price maintenance which, in fact, is but regular price fixing,
left to the authority of private citizens and to be exercised without any
governmental supervision. The view of the United States Supreme
Court that the law does not attempt to fix prices but only permits the
making of agreements, is not taken into consideration. On the other
hand, the Federal Trade Commission, which is known to be opposed to
fair trade legislation, is cited in support of the philosophy of the Court.
It would seem proper to refer here passingly to a very important
democratic fundamental. The judge who is asked to enforce a claim
on the basis of a given law is authorized to examine the validity of
this law. It is clear that the law, under such circumstances, is extreme-
ly exposed to attacks by the litigating parties. It is, to a certain extent,
put on a par with all the other facts involved in the given lawsuit. The
courts are well aware of this situation, which cannot be changed with-
out eliminating important guarantees which democracy affords the citi-
zen. In Czty of Jacksonville v. Bowden 14 the very same Court therefore
140 S. (2d) 371, 375 (Fla. 1949).
"40 S. (2d) 371, 374 (Fla. 1949).
"40 S. (2d) 371, 374 (Fla. 1949).
"67 Fla. 181, 64 So. 769, 772 (1914).
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said that "in exercising the exceedingly delicate and responsible power
and duty to declare legislative enactments to be contrary to the Con-
stitution. the courts should . refrain from declining to enforce
statutes, except in cases of clear and unmistakable violations of the
the Constitution. . " The Supreme Court of Florida expressly wants
no duly enacted law to be declared inoperative unless it clearly appears
beyond reasonable doubt to violate the Constitution.
In the instant case it is hard to see how the Fair Trade law is a
"clear and unmistakable violation of the Constitution" if the courts in
many other states15 and the Supreme Court of the United States16 after
careful examination found such laws valid.
Nevertheless, it may be concluded from the majority decision of
the Court that it intended to void the entire act and not the parts com-
plained of only. Particularly, the objection that the act violates the
constitutional principle of equality before the law by favoring those
who make vertical agreements and holding only horizontal agreements
to be unlawful,17 evidently points to the entire purpose of the law
rather than to the non-signer clause alone.
Does this holding conform to the principle enunciated by the same
Court in City of Jacksonville v. Bowden? The answer must be no, par-
ticularly since the Liquor Store case also presents a clear-cut example of
a clash between the philosophy of a State court and the United States
Supreme Court as expressed by the latter in the Old Dearborn case.
It might happen that after the Liquor Store decision a similar case, in-
volving interstate commerce, would reach the Supreme Court of the
United States. Suppose in that case the commodity in question has been
transported to any place in Florida so that the court in accordance with
the Miller-Tydings Act 1 8 would have to solve the preliminary ques-
tion whether fair trade agreements are lawful in Florida. In answer-
ing this question, the United States Supreme Court, in view of the
Max Factor & Co. v. Kunsman, 5 Cal. (2d) 446, 55 P. (2d) 177 (1936); Seagram-
Distillers Corp. v.Old Dearborn Distributing Co., 363 II1. 61o, 2 N. E. (2d) 940 (1936);
Pepsodent Co. v. Krauss Co., 2oo La. 959, 9 S. (2d) 303 (1942); Bourjos Sales Corp.
v. Dortman, 273 N. Y. 167, 7 N. E. (2d) 30 (1937); Ely Lilly & Co. v. Saunders, 216
N. C. 163, 4 S. E. (2d) 528 (1939); Weco Products Co. v. Reed Drug Co., 225 Wis. 474,
274 N. W. 426 (1937).
1Old Dearborn Distributing Go. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U. S. 183, 57
S. Ct. 139, 81 L. ed. 109 (1936); Kunsman v. Max Factor & Co., 299 U. S. 198, 57 S. Ct
147, 81 L. ed. 122 (1936).
2'26 Stat. 209 (189o), 15 U. S. C. A. § 1 (1941).
"Chap. 69o, Title VIII, 50 Stat. 693 (1937), 15 U. S. C. A. § 1 (1941). This law
was enacted in order to make the various fair trade laws of the individual states
more effective: Cf. Pepsodent Co. v. Krauss Co., 56 F. Supp. 922 (E. D. La. i944).
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Liquor Store decision, would have to abandon its construction given
to the California and Illinois Fair Trade Acts, 19 although in no es-
sential point do they differ from the Florida Act, and-against its con-
viction-declare the given price maintenance agreement to be an un-
lawful and punishable violation of the Anti-Trust Law. Should the
Supreme Court of the United States regard itself as not bound by the
Florida decision-which seems improbable 20-the legal situation would
become most complicated. It may be that this was one of the reasons
why the New York Court of Appeals which previously had declared the
New York Fair Trade Act unconstitutional, 21 in express consideration
of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, 22 overruled
itself.23 The Court stressed that it would have accepted the rulings of
the United States Supreme Court if the Old Dearborn decision had
been available when the Doubleday case came before it.
Soon after the Liquor Store decision the Florida act was amended
without delay.2 4 In accordance with Section io of the new Fair Trade
law, the Attorney General may bring an action to restrain the per-
formance or enforcement of any price maintenance agreement if he
finds that a given agreement prevents competition with regard to
the same general class or that the commodity in question is not in free
and open competition with merchandise of the same general class.
There is some resemblance to subsection (7) (a) of the Wisconsin
Fair Trade Act25 which provides that the State Department of Agri-
culture may hold a hearing upon a complaint that the minimum resale
price is not correct. If it finds the complaint justified it may declare
such contract to be in restraint of trade. It seems not unimportant
that the Agriculture Department does not interfere ex officio but only
-upon complaint," the right to such complaints given to any person.
IiKunsman v. Max Factor & Co., 299 U. S. 198, 57 S. Ct. 147, 81 L. ed. 122 (1936);
Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagrams-Distillers Corp., 299 U. S. 183, 57 S. Ct.
i39, 81 L .ed. 109 (1936).
'In view of the doctrine established by Erie Ry. Co. v. Thompkins, 304 U. S.
64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. ed. 1188 (1938).
nDoubleday, Doran & Co. Inc. v. R. H. Macy & Co., 269, N. Y. 272, 199 N. E.
409 (1936).
2Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U. S. 183, 57
S. Ct. 139, 81 L. ed. 109 (1936).
2Bourjois Sales Corp. v. Dortman, 273 N. Y. 167, 7 N. E. (2d) 30 (1937).
"Florida Laws, c. 252o4. This is the second amendment. The first Florida Trade
Law was made in 1937 [Florida Laws (1937) c. 18395]. It was first held unconstitu-
tional because the text of the law was not, as provided in the Florida Constitution
(§ 16, Art. III) disclosed in the title. Bristol-Myers Co. v. Webb's Cut Rate Drug Co.,
137 Fla. 5o8, 188 So. 91 (1939). The law was immediately amended.
21Wis. Stat. (1947) c. 133.25.
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The Department itself is of the opinion that "it would strengthen the
law and its enforcement if there was some provision whereby registra-
tion [of the fair trade contract] with the state would be mandatory."26
The general opinion of the Florida Supreme Court in respect of
fair trade is rejected by the Legislature which in Section i (findings of
fact) develops its own theory on this subject. Considering itself entirely
free and solely competent to choose between economic policies, it
finds, determines and declares that the public interests and general wel-
fare "of the State of Florida will best be served by permitting the
maintenance of minimum resale prices" of trade-marked, branded or
named commodities and that the object of the Act is to prevent
monopoly. It can hardly be assumed that the struggle between judici-
ary and legislature will be continued. Any return to the policy as ex-
pressed in Miles v. Park would be met with the argument that this de-
cision goes back to the pre-statutory time and that it expressly hinted
at a change of the legal situation by appropriate statute.2 7
2Letter written to the author of this case comment, signed by Mr. George
Warner, Supervisor, Weights and Measures Inspection.
-"Nor can the manufacturer , in the absence of contract or statutory right,
even though the restriction be known to the purchasers, fix prices for future sales."
220 U. S. 373, 405, 31 S. Ct. 376, 383, 55 L. ed. 502, 517 (1911). (italics supplied).
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